In continuation of my reflections after KazanForum 2026, I would like to focus on one of the central ideas of my presentation: the need to rethink the central space of Eurasia.

Today, the countries located in the central part of Eurasia are often analyzed through separate and overlapping regional categories: Central Asia, South Asia, the Middle East, the Caucasus, Russia, China’s western direction, the Islamic world, the post-Soviet space, transport corridors, and so on.

Each of these categories may be useful in a limited analytical context. But together, they often prevent us from seeing the larger picture.

The key problem is that the central area of Eurasia remains conceptually fragmented. It is discussed through different regional lenses, but rarely as a single functional space with its own development potential.

However, to understand why this matters, we need to look at a broader transformation of the world economy.

The world should increasingly move toward to formation of large functional subsystems. Some of them are monocentric, built historically. Others are polycentric, formed around one dominant center or several interconnected centers.

Monocentric and Polycentric Functional Subsystems of the World Economy – © Nazir Magsi

In this emerging architecture, China can be understood as a powerful monocentric functional subsystem, where territory, market, resources, industrial capacity, and strategic coordination are concentrated historically. India also represents a large monocentric subsystem.

The American space forms a broad but asymmetrical polycentric subsystem, linking North and Latin America through resources, markets, finance, technologies, and continental-scale economic influence, while the United States remains its clearly dominant center.

The European space represents another polycentric subsystem, built around a dense network of states, institutions, markets, infrastructure, technologies, and regulatory mechanisms. It is one of the most established polycentric systems of modern times.

ASEAN represents a polycentric configuration in Southeast Asia, where several national economies are linked through production chains, maritime connectivity, labor, investment, and regional complementarity.

Africa can be seen as an emerging polycentric subsystem, with enormous resource potential, demographic growth, territorial scale, and the long-term possibility of a stronger internal market.

The Eurasian Core, in turn, should be understood as a potential polycentric functional subsystem. It is not built around a single dominant center, but around the possible interaction of Russia, Central Asia, Pakistan, Iran, the Caucasus, and adjacent regions.

This distinction is important.

A functional subsystem becomes mature not only when it has political borders or formal institutions, but when it can recognize itself as a complete economic-development space. In my view, such completeness depends on three key dimensions: resources, market, and territory.

Three Dimensions of a Functional Economic System – © Nazir Magsi

Resources provide the material and energy basis for reproduction and development.

Market provides demographic scale, demand, consumption, production circulation, and long-term economic capacity.

Territory provides connectivity, depth, internal circulation, and the spatial basis for integration.

If a system has access to resources, a sufficiently large internal market, and a coherent territorial basis for connectivity and development, it can act not merely as a fragmented region, but as a full functional system.

This is where a new logic of world development becomes possible.

Instead of endless competition for external markets, external resources, and external spheres of influence, major functional subsystems should begin to recognize their own internal potential. When each system understands its resource base, market capacity, and territorial logic, the need for aggressive external expansion may decrease.

This does not remove competition completely.

But it can reduce its destructive intensity.

It can shift the global agenda from geopolitical pressure and zero-sum rivalry toward internal development, functional balance, and mutually beneficial connectivity between large systems.

In this sense, the formation of functional subsystems is not necessarily a threat to the world order. On the contrary, it may become one of the ways to reduce international tension, if these systems develop as self-aware functional spaces rather than as expansionist blocs.

But for this to happen, each subsystem must first understand itself.

And this is precisely the challenge for Eurasia.

Unlike China or India, the central Eurasian space is not organized around a single civilizational, political, or economic center. It is polycentric by nature.

Russia, Central Asia, Pakistan, Iran, the Caucasus, and neighboring regions are connected through geography, history, energy, security, labor mobility, transport, education, trade, and cultural ties. But they are still rarely understood as parts of one emerging functional configuration.

This fragmentation is not only analytical. It has practical consequences.

It slows down the development of internal markets, weakens industrial cooperation, limits educational and technological exchange, complicates transport integration, and keeps many countries dependent on external centers of demand, finance, logistics, and technology.

That is why I believe we need to start thinking in terms of a Eurasian Functional Core.

Eurasian Core and Eurasian Core Potential Zone – © Nazir Magsi

The idea of such a core is not about creating a closed bloc. It is not about opposing Europe, China, India, ASEAN, Africa, or the American space.

On the contrary, a Eurasian Functional Core could strengthen the entire continental system.

It could help the central Eurasian space recognize itself as a full functional subsystem with its own resources, internal market potential, territorial connectivity, industrial complementarities, educational networks, and long-term development agenda.

The central Eurasian space should not be treated merely as a transit zone between larger economies. It should become a space of its own development.

A Eurasian Functional Core could create a more stable internal market, support industrial and technological cooperation, improve connectivity between Russia, Central Asia, Pakistan, Iran, the Caucasus, and neighboring regions, and provide a stronger foundation for long-term prosperity.

 This is especially important because many existing global and regional systems have already reached a point where their further growth requires new internal sources of demand, cooperation, and stability.

A stronger Eurasian Core can provide exactly this.

Therefore, established economic centers should not fear the formation of such a core. They should understand that it is not a threat, but a structural necessity for Eurasia itself and potentially a stabilizing factor for the wider world.

 A fragmented Eurasia limits everyone.

 A functionally connected Eurasia creates opportunities for everyone.

The real question is whether we are ready to move beyond inherited regional thinking and start seeing Eurasia as a living, interconnected economic system.